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ABSTRACT 
The paper discus ses  development economics, The paper 
cri tiques i t , It concludes by indicating those port ions tha t are 
"sa lvageable" for po sitive analy si s .  
Development economics i s  concerned with the eff ici ent 
a l loca tion of resource s in poor societies . It is d i s t inctive in 
its stress on the temporal property of economies and in its 
concern w i th the making of efficient al loca tions over time, 
Within "convent iona l "  economics, it is a l s o  distinguish ed by the 
stress it places on the role of the publ i c  sector . 
As a social sci ence, development economics make s several 
core assumptions, each of which is seriously flawed ,  
1 . That ineffici ency implies irrationa l i ty .  
2. That the notion of the social wel fare is a meaningful
concept ; tha t it can provide a guide to  public pol icy; that
it can be measured in economic t erms ; and that i t  is
embodied in the choices of government s ,
3. That rational people will make choices tha t lead to
ef ficient outcomes and tha t these outcomes will be stabl e ,
What should be retained for po si tive analy s i s  i s  the 
assumption of rationality in choice and the method of equil ibrium 
analy s i s .  The paper concludes by i l lustra ting the importance of 
these tools  for research in anthropo logy . 
INTRODUCTION 
SOME CORE ASSUMPTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
Robert H. Bates 
California Insti tute of Technology 
The purpo se of this paper is three-fo ld.  It seeks to outl ine 
"conv ent ional 11 development economic s .  I t  cri tiques t h e  field . And i t  
indica tes what should be sa lvaged from it f o r  social analy s i s .  
The principal argument o f  the paper is that development 
economic s offers a weak founda tion for social analysis.  One road to  
such a cri tique has al ready been wel l traversed and will  no t be taken 
here : t o  move outside the economic paradigm, to indica te the range of 
critical variables which have been omitted by development economists,  
and to no te how their conclusions are vi tiated by the exclus ion of 
these fac tors . Anthropologi s t s  have part icipa ted vigorous ly in thi s 
form of criticism and it would add l i t t l e  were I to recapi t ulate their 
contribution. An alternat iv e  and more powerful tactic is available,  
howev er, and i t  is one that I adopt : a critique of development 
economic s mounted from within i t s  own parad igm. The attrac t ion of 
thi s approach i s  that i t  i s  more fundamenta l .  For if  development 
economic s can be shown to be "bad economics, " then it is in di fficulty 
even before being falsified on other ground s .  
Contemporary development economic s spans a n  enormous range of 
topics and perspectives.  Any at tempt to critique the field is 
therefore open to a persuasive rej oinder : tha t the cri tic i s  
a t tacking an inaccurate characteriza tion. To f ine sse thi s counter, I 
confine my self to what would appear to be the minimal agenda of the 
field ; the various approaches taken in development economics and the 
different appl ica tions of it can be s een as  varia tions on the themes 
which I explore.  And insofar the field does make core a s sumptions , 
they will be ev ident in the manner in which i t  handles this minimum 
agenda . My critici sms should thu s be well directed .  
THE AGENDA OF THE FIELD 
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Like economics in general ,  development economics fo cus es on 
the efficient al location of resource s .  It i s  concerned w i th 
ef ficiency at particular points of time . But what principal ly 
differentiates it from other branches of economics is i ts concern with 
the efficiency of allo ca tions over t ime. In particular, the field has 
a central and distinctive concern with economic dynamic s : with 
chang e s  in per-capita incomes and with the changes in productive 
factors and their inter-relations which make thes e  chang e s  pos sibl e .  
N o  l e s s  than their cohorts i n  o ther fields o f  economic s ,  
development economists a r e  concerned w i th static effici ency . They 
cri tique trade policies, for example,  in terms of the excessive cos t s  
which they engender. A common criticism is that poor countries employ 
too many resources in the production of manufac tured commodities which 
they formerly imported from abroad . Such resource s  could more 
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product ively be s pent ,  it is argued, in promo t ing the export of goods 
in which the country holds a comparative advantage ;  for through such 
specializa tion the country could bo th finance needed imports and s t i l l  
have resources left over with which t o  undertake further produc t iv e  
activities,  The classic cri tique of import subs t i tuting 
industrializ a tion i s ,  of course,  that of L i t t le,  Scitovsky and S co t t .  
I t  ha s been extended and deepened i n  the volumes produced by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research under the edi torship of Krueger 
and Baghwa ti, l 
Particularly notabl e  is the relevance of thi s l i terature to 
the study of rural societies.  For a major theme i s  that the trad e 
pol icies adopted a s  part of the effort to promo te domestic 
industrializa tion impose, in effec t ,  a tax on agriculture.  The over­
valua t ion of domestic currencies which serves to cheapen capi tal 
imports for industry serve s  as wel l to penal iz e  export agricultur e ;  
and the protec tion of domestic industries rai s e s  the price of 
manufactured consumer items,  thus shifting the terms of trade again st 
the rural sector , 2 One consequence is an undermining of the 
incentives to farmers and a contraction of the agricultural economy . 
Another consequence rapidly follow s ,  In ef fort s  to counteract the 
decline in agricul ture, governments crea te new produc tion incent ive s  
in t h e  form o f  subsidies f o r  farm inpu t s ;  and an important effect of 
such pol icies i s  the promo t ion of large-sca le,  mechanized produc t ion. 
Not only do the trade regimes thus tend to weaken the agricul tural 
sector ; but they thus also tend to lead to the adopt ion of policies 
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which transform the s tructure of rural society . 3 
The concern of development economists  with efficiency is also 
marked by the critici sm of marketing pol icies in third-world 
countri es.  They criticiz e these pol icies for the economic dis tort ions 
which they create,  A common charge,  for example,  is that government s  
intervene in marke ts and impose uniform prices and tha t they thereby 
was t e  resource s ,  Because price s  are uniform over space, regions of 
the country enter product ion which would s tay out of produc tion were 
prices to ref l ect real transport cost s ;  and becaus e they are uniform 
over time, government s  fail to reduce prices when goods are no t scarce 
and so mus t  devo te resource s  which could more profi tably be spent in 
other endeavors to the carry ing of large inventori es . 4 
These criticisms too have been strikingly advanced in the 
analysis of agriculture,  Jones,  Dodge and other, for example,  have 
noted the tendency for Zambian agricul tur e  to move to the wide spread 
monocropping of maize due at lea s t  in part to the gov ernment' s 
at temp t s  to e stabl ish a uniform maize price throughout the nation, 
Places far dis tant from urban markets had once specializ ed in the 
produc tion of high value crops , such as  tobacco, coffee and 
groundnut s ;  with the ri s e  in maiz e price s in dis tant loca t ions, 
howev er, farmers moved out of the produc tion of such cash crops and 
into the product ion of maiz e ,  Zambia therefore experienced shortfal l s 
in the production of high valued crops . Ironically ,  despi t e  the 
movement into maiz e brought on by the uniform pricing pol icy , there 
wa s no concomi tant increase  in deliveries of maiz e to the urban area s ;  
the cos t s  of the policy uniform pricing, in t erms of incr ea s ed prices 
and declines in the produc tion of other crops,  produced f ewer 
benefits,  in t erms of increased grain supplies,  than had been 
expec ted, For uniform prices disregard the cos t s  of trans port and so 
provide no incentive s  for persons to  move maize f rom a loca tion where 
it receives a low price to a loca tion where the price may be higher . 
There was thus little  incentive for maiz e marketing to grow in 
proport ion to maiz e production, 5 
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Uniform prices over space thus lead to fai lures to a l loca te 
resources in a way that conserve for the cos t s  of distance ; they l ead 
to inappropriate production decisions and to failures in transport , 
S imilarly , uni form prices over time l ead to failures to cut back on 
production when co s t s  are low and fai lur es to increa se produc tion when 
costs are high ; they therefore exacerba te periods of g lut and famine 
and require unneces sary expenditures in s torage.  An i l lustration of 
this  phenomenon i s  prov ided by the Kenyan dairy industry. By not 
al lowing prices to fal l during the rainy sea son, when pa sturage wa s 
ample and milk production "easy ", the Kenyan pol icy of uni form prices 
led to over produc tion and nece ssi tated costly programs of milk 
storage and disposal, Convers ely , by fail ing to increase prices in 
the dry s eason, the pol icy failed to provide incentives for farmers to 
spend resources on supplemental feeding so as  to promote off-sea son 
milk produc tion, The result was sea sonal shortages -- shortage s  which 
were invariably attributed by the public to "drought" rather than 
pricing policies, 6 
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Th ese exampl e s  i l lustrate the emphasis on static efficiency 
which characteriz e s  development economics, This emphasis is reflected 
as wel l in the too l kit of the development practitioner, Development 
s pecial ists  use, for example, econometric methods to mea sure the 
t echnical efficiency of firms , i . e .  to determine whether, given their 
resources,  they are utiliz ing tha t t echnology which enables them to 
produce the maximal output , And they have dev elo ped as  wel l 
econometric tests  of the price efficiency of f irms ,  i. e, methods of 
determining whether at  the margin producers are selec ting input s and 
producing outputs in proportion to their relative prices,  thereby 
maximizing prof i t s , 7 Moreov er, development economists repeatedly
utilize one of the mo st ba sic too l s  of the appl ied economi s t : the 
methods of proj ect apprai sa l ,  Correcting for the distort ions in 
prices which lead to ina ppropriate assessments of true scarcity ,  they 
seek to determine whether the propo sed use of resources is efficien t ,  
i , e ,  whether resources a r e  being u sed to the point where the cost s  
equal the benefits a t  the margin and whether the net benefits  are 
greater than those genera ted by alternative uses of scarce resource s , 8 
This concern wi th efficiency should not be surprising . 
Development economics is ,  after al l ,  but a branch of economic s ,  
Moreover, the field i s  concerned with countries i n  which scarci ty i s  a 
particularly dramat ic fact of life, In area s where productive 
resource s  are extraord inarily scarce, misa l loca tions are l ikely to  
have larger than average consequence s ,  Pa rticular care, then, should 
be paid to  their effic i ent  utiliz a tion, The emphasis is thus 
appropriate and unsurprising , 
The concern with s ta t ic efficiency is a characteri s t ic which 
development economics shares with other branches of economic s, What 
distinguishes dev elopment economics is i t s  concern with the temporal 
property of economies , Development economics stresses that the 
quantity of productive factors is a function of t ime ; that their 
q ua l i ty i s  a funct ion of t ime ; and tha t their product ive 
interrelations al t er with time, 
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The emphasis upon the temporal property of economies is mo st 
clearly seen in the stres s placed upon capital. Capi tal is inherently 
intertemporal ; it takes resources out of consumption in one period so 
a s  to  increa se consumption in another. Moreov er, the productive 
po s s ibi l i ties of any group at  any point in time i s  de termined by the 
capi tal s to ck at i t s  command ; and to increa s e  per capita incomes, one 
must therefore increase the ratio of capi tal to labor. Given the 
s tress on the importance of increa sing the per capita consump t ion 
which l ies at the heart of development economics, it is therefore 
na tural that persons in the field would place primary emphasis  upon 
capi tal formation. 
This emphasis charact erized much of the early work in the 
field ; many of the early growth models  -- such as  thos e  of Harod and 
Domar -- were driven by the proce ss of capi tal formation, 9 The la ter
"s tag e s  theories" rested upon the as sumption that growth resul t ed from 
savings and capi tal investment ; this work i s  s t i l l  best repr esented by 
Ro stow' s seminal contribution, 1 0  More recent contributions have
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altered the materia l i s tic bias inherent in these earlier works and 
affirmed instead the central role of people.  They have emphasiz ed the 
formation of "human capi tal "  and stres sed the role of investment s in 
ski l l s  in the generat ion of economic growth. ll The emph a s i s  on capi tal
formation has been criticiz ed by some ; but many who dis s ent from it do 
so only because they bel iev e  that the quality of capi tal i s  at  least 
a s  important as the quant i ty ,  that is ,  that it must be of the 
"appropriate"  kind in order to be productive. 1 2  
An analysis  of capital qui t e  naturally dominat e s  a field which 
is so centra l ly concerned w i th the temporal property of economie s ,  
The concern i s  reflected a s  wel l i n  the emphasis  placed upon the 
manner in which other factors of produc tion alter as  a function of 
time. Population s tudi es and ecological analy si s :  both belong 
natural ly in a field where factors such as labor and land are model led 
as a function of t ime. Development economic s stresses a s  wel l changes 
in the na ture of produc tion functions, i, e, changes in the way in 
which product iv e  factors are combined, Inquiries into the sources of 
technical change and investiga tions of the de terminants of innovative 
capabil ities -- both na turally belong in a field concerned w i th the 
dynamic a s  wel l as  the sta t ic properties of economies, 1 3  
As i n  the study of al loca tions made at  single points i n  t ime, 
development economics stresses the analysis of the effici ency of 
alloca tions which are made over time, It is concerned in particular 
with the selec t ion of optimal investment programs programs which 
wi thdraw resources from present consumpt ion so as to enhance future 
consumption po ssib i l ities. The analy sis  of optimal growth s trategies 
i s  central to thi s  f ield. 
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It should be noted that in elaborating o n  the central themes 
of their discipline, development economis t s  have long engaged in a 
v igorous interchange wi th anthropology. The importance of this 
interchange is marked, for examp le, by the fact tha t anthropo logis t s  
n o  longer c a n  pretend tha t local communi ties stand in isola tion f rom 
the economic force s generated by government policies. The 
significance of these pol icies for economic behavior has been 
unders cored by development economis t s ; and under the tutelage of those 
in development economic s,  anthropolog i s t s  have come to appreciate 
their importance, 
This interchange has not been one sided, howev er, 
Anthropo log i s t s  have bolstered the founda t ions of the development 
economists' critique of government programs,  for example,  by 
demons trating the ra tiona l i ty of peasant behav ior and thus the 
susceptibi l i ty of peasants to the dis tortion of incentives induced by 
public pol ici es. The works surveyed in the chapter by Or tiz 
i l lustrate thi s  contribution. Other anthropolog i s t s  have taken the 
oppo s i t e  tact and underscored the l imi ted appl icab i l i ty of the 
a s sumptions of development economic s ,  Some have shown that income is 
not the so l e  force driving decision making by pea sants,  for example ; 
prob l ems of risk and risk management are a l so critical in pea sant 
deci sion, l 4  In these and other ways they have challenged some of the
maj o r  premi ses underlying the analysis of static efficiency by 
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development economists. 
The contributions of anthropology have been more marked in the 
analysis of economic dynamic s ,  Anthropologists  were among the first 
to examine the fact ors which promo ted the degrada tion of soils and the 
growth of popula tions ; Bo serup' s seminal work addressed both land use 
management and popula tion growth and did so within a s ingle 
framework. 1 5  The work of Al lan on the carrying capacity of land, of
Ruthenberg on rotational practices,  and of Jacobs and o ther s on 
pas tora l i s t  land use i l lustrate the continuation of interest in this 
area . 16 Anthropological s tudies have also scrutiniz ed the role of
capi ta l and the way in which i t  can change with time;  in particular, 
they have examined the way s in which capi tal is loca ted , mobiliz ed ,  
and invested in societies lacking formal markets f o r  thi s resource ,  
Hill and B erry , for example,  analyz ed capi tal formation in the tree 
crop economies of We s t  Af rica, a theme I have followed up on in my 
studies of human capi ta l formation among families in the Lua pula 
region of Zambia, 1 7
Anthropolog i s t s  have also contributed to t h e  study of t h e  way s 
in which product ive factors have been recombined so a s  to enhance the 
value of the output which they generate. Hill,  Berry and Eps tein 
all  have examined the role of innovators and entrepreneur s in the 
economies of developing societies. And Boserup, Geertz , Ruthenberg 
and others have studied the dynamic properties of produc tion 
functions , particularly in peasant agricul tur e. 1 8  
In this dialogue, there remain s much for anthropo log i s t s  to 
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learn f rom their colleagues in development economic s ,  Change s  in 
pea sant product ion functions have been modeled ,  for example,  by 
Go t sch ; and the work of Hyami and Rut tan on induced innovat ion i s  
insuf ficiently known, 1 9  Both studies empha siz e t h e  role o f  prices in
inducing t echnological change something which anthropo logis t s  tend 
to underplay , placing as they do greater emphasis on the role of 
phy sical factor proportions . 
Dev elopment economics is thus concerned with sta t ic 
efficiency . It is distinguished by i t s  concern with the intertemporal 
property of economies.  There is another characteristic, howev er, 
which deserves mention, and i t  too i s  distinctive.  As  a branch of  
"conventional 11 economics, development economics places an  inordina te 
stress on the role of government s .  
Development economists remain deeply skeptical a s  t o  whether 
private,  decentral iz ed decision-makers can make efficient 
inter temporal choices,  Private deci s ion-makers may dis count the 
future at too high a rate, they contend ; governments,  as  cus todians of 
the interests  of a l l  genera tions, may therefore be bet ter sui ted to 
choosing an appropriate l evel of saving s .  Moreover, optimal l evels of 
capi tal format ion, i t  i s  held, entai l savings decisions made under 
conditions of imperfect marke t s ;  for there is a pub l ic goods property 
to intergenerational transfers. 20 Human capi tal forma tion is also 
subj ect to market failur e ;  for investments  in human capi tal genera te 
external b enef its  and too l i ttle i s  therefore l ikely to take place if 
left to  private choice , 21 In addi tion, much of the capi tal required
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for the execution of optimal inter temporal programs ha s inherent 
pub l ic goods properties ; it takes the form of infra s tructur e :  roads,  
communica tions sy stems,  and so forth. And even when inves tment 
decisions involve purely private good s,  i t  i s  argued , these 
investments,  to be productive, mus t  be made jointly; private 
inv estment deci sion mus t  be central ly coordinated and r equire firm 
mutual assurances, for, fail ing these, no decisions may be made at  
ali. 22
The inference drawn f rom al l these l ines of rea soning is that 
government s  have a maj or role to play in the development proce s s .  
Indeed, i n  n o  other f i e l d  of "conventiona l "  economics i s  government 
intervention so freely prescribed . As a consequence, a s  a technical 
field, development economics often becomes public  sector economics ; i t  
becomes a n  exercise in planning , Rather than the private marke t ,  the 
government becomes the central mover in the creation and 
impl ementa tion of intertemporal programs . In no other branch of 
economic s ,  perhaps,  does the public sector play so ov ert and maj or a 
role,  
DEFI CIENT ASSUMPTIONS 
Individual Ra tiona lity Equa l s  Social Ra tiona lity 
The basic commitment of development economic s ,  I have argued, 
i s  to the efficient al loca tion of resource s ,  bo th at  a g iven poin t in 
time and intertemporally.  Few would contest  thi s central premi s e .  
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Efficiency , after al l,  is a neces sary condi tion for the maximiza tion 
of almost  any conception of the social wel fare; wha tever one's 
normative commi tment s,  thes e  values will best  be real iz ed when 
society ' s  resources are al loca ted in the mos t  produc tive manner , It i s  
not a s  an ethical s tanda rd , then, that thi s premi s e  i s  deficient; 
rather, i t  is def ici ent as a guide to pos i t ive analy s i s .  
The cri teria is misappl ied in a t  least two way s .  In bo th 
instances,  the inf erential process begins by not ing that resources 
have been inefficiently employed , In both instances, i t  deriv es 
conclusions concerning the ra tiona l i ty of individua l s ,  Social 
irra tiona l i ty -- i.e, the inefficient use of resources -- i s  cited as 
sufficient rea son for inferring the irrationality of individual 
deci sion-makers ,  No ting the widespread inefficiency of resource use 
in the developing a reas, parti cularly a s  a consequence of governmental 
pol icy choice s ,  economic analy s t s  f requently infer that people 
( especial ly pol icy maker s )  are engaged in i rrational choice making , 23
Misconceiying Rationality 
In that ex-po st evalua tions are used to critique decisions 
taken ex-ante, such an inference i s  in error ,  Ra tiona l i ty requires 
that individual decision-makers choose their 11top11 or mo st preferred 
alterna tive,  These al ternat ives will be ranked in t erms of their 
value in enabl ing the indiv idua l to secure his or her preferences.  
Ra tionality say s nothing about the content of these 
preference s ,  Some model s  of rational choice, for example,  po s i t  
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preferences which imply a n  aversion t o  r i s k  whi le other do not; 
minimax model s  of rational choice require tha t alternatives be ranked 
in terms of their least favorable po ssible outcomes,  clearly imply ing 
an extreme form of risk aver sion and , for many purpo ses,  a biz arre 
form of preference . Equa l ly as important,  rat ionality does no t 
requi re perf ect information, Quite the contrary; mo st model s  of 
rational behavior al low for imperfect estima tes of outcomes and, 
granting that informa t ion is costly , many allow for the acqui ring of 
"optimal "  l evels  of informa tion, The impl ica tion i s  clear : behaving 
rationally ,  people may wel l choose to remain ignoran t ,  This accord s  
with every day experience, for many o f  us ch eerful ly and prof i tably 
remain ignorant of forces which are too weak to affect us  strongly or 
too impenetrable to be understood w i thout an exhorbi tant expendi ture 
of effort , And, when forces do make a di ff erence,  we often acquire 
information in i ts least expensive and often imperf ect form, e . g .  by 
talking to a family member, co-worker, or f riend , rather than by 
becoming a wel l informed special i s t  on the subj ect, 2 4  
The concept of individual rationa l i ty i s  thus a narrow one, 
I t  does not impose condi tions on the content of preference s ,  N o r  does 
i t  require perfect informa tion, I t  requires only that choice makers 
order alterna tive courses of action in terms of their estima tes of the 
consequences for the values they seek to attain and that they chose  
that al ternative which they expect to  y ield the mos t  favorable 
outcome, Were the individual to sy stematica l ly choose an alternat iv e  
a t  the "bottom" o f  h i s  or her ranking -- i .  e ,  one that would s ecure 
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the least preferred resul t -- then that person would be behav ing 
irrationally .  The sy stematic choice of such sel f-defeating 
alternatives l i es outside the realm of rationa l choice analysis; i t s  
analysis l ies within the special domain o f  those sciences which s t udy 
irra tional behavior. 
Perf ect knowledge, then, is not required a s  a condi tion of 
rationality .  But development economists review the pa s t  experiences 
of developing societies.  They apprai se proj ect choices, compare 
retrospectively the performance of various economies and analyz e the 
succes s  of alterna tive development strategi es.  Evaluating choic e s  
retrospectively , development economists pos sess  "perfect 1 1  information:  
they know how decisions worked out , When they employ tha t know ledge 
to critique the suppo sed rationality of the makers of the decision, 
they are implicitly a s suming that the decisi on-makers themselves 
possessed such a "ful l information" vantage poin t .  The decision­
maker s,  of cour se, did not , And when they make decisions which proved 
to be socially irra t iona l ,  that does not then necessarily mean that 
the decision-maker s  were themselves behaving i rrationa l ly .  They 
could,  in fact,  have been behaving perfectly rational ly and have been 
overtaken by unforeseen event s or simply have been mistaken. 
In no o ther social s ci ence discipline is the concept of 
ra tiona l  choice so deeply embedded as it is in economic s ,  It i s  
particularly disturbing, therefore, that development economists should 
misuse this concep t ,  
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S o c i a l  Rationality Impl ies Ind iyidua l Ra t ionality 
Confusing "ex-po s t "  and "ex-ante" decision making i s  thu s one 
way in which the efficiency cri terion is mistakenly employ ed in the 
drawing of inf erence s .  Another source of error i s  the apparent bel i ef 
that individual rationality is a neces sary condi tion for the 
attainment of social ly rational outcomes.  
Ob s erving the inef ficient use of society's resource s, 
development economists of t en inf er that persons made irrat ional 
choi ces.  This inference i s  not  warranted, for, individual choices, 
even when ra t ional ,  do no t necessarily lead to socially rat iona l 
outcomes . This point is founda tional . It goes to the core of much of 
cont emporary economic s ,  And it is of great signi ficance for other 
social sciences as wel l .  It therefore warrants elaboration. 
From at  l east the time of Adam Smi th, the marke t ha s been 
ana lyz ed as a mechanism for aggregating individual want s into social 
out comes and has been extol l ed for it abi l i ty to do so in a highly 
desirab l e  manner ,  The benevolent operations o f  t h e  "hidden hand" i s  
o f  course  a well know constru c t .  Among the desirab l e  properties which
the marke t is held to  secur e, efficiency in the al loca tion of scarce 
resources i s  of course  foremo s t ,  But in the early 1 950's s everal 
economis t s  analyzed the properties of market economies and their 
resul t s  generated deep skepticism concerning the ability of markets to 
secure efficient outcomes. So  ba sic are the se resul t s  that they are 
ref erred to as  the fundamenta l theorems of wel fare economic s . 25 A 
maj o r  finding was that the "hidden hand" could opera te benef icently 
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only under a n  extraordinarily restrictive set o f  as sumptions.  
Rational actors, operating in market setting s ,  would make choices 
which produce socially rational.  i.e. efficient, outcomes only under 
the mos t  exceptional circums tanc es . The obv ious inference to be drawn 
is that there is l i t t l e  reason to expect that individua l ly rational 
behavior, even by al l members of society ,  will  induce the efficient 
use of so ciety ' s  scarce resources.  
The condi tions under which individua l ly rational choices 
aggregate into socially irrational outcomes have proven to be very 
general . 26 And many of the mo st interest ing a rea s of contemporary
economic research have focused upon them. One common si tua tion i s  the 
exi s t ence of direct phy sica l  l inkages between producers -- l inks which 
are unmediated by any market,  Such condi tions are referred to a s  
product ion externa l i ties.  Where no market-like institution spans an 
externa l i ty ,  then economic incentives fail  to induce rational actors 
to opera te a t  levels  of production that support a socia l ly de sirable 
use of society ' s  resource s .  For example,  a profit maximiz ing firm may 
use resources in a way that produce s  too much pol lution ( a  "nega tive" 
ext ernal i ty ) or a labor force with too f ew  ski l l s  (a  "po si tive" 
external i ty ) ,  In the presence of externalities,  too few resources go 
into activities  which produce beneficial external effec t s  and too many 
into the activities  which result in the product ion of harmful one s .  
Innovating market-like incentive sy stems - - e , g ,  imposing f ines for 
pol lution or sel l ing "l icenses to pol lute" -- corrects the prob l em by 
making producers take into private account the social costs  or 
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benef i t s  of their product ion decisions . They thereby induce rationa l 
actors to make private choices  which lead to the effici ent use of 
society ' s  resources,  
Another common ci rcumstance involves interdependence among the 
utility functions of individual actors.  Such ci rcums tance s ari s e  when 
the consumpt ion choi ces of one person directly enter the utility 
function of ano ther . This si tua tion commonly occurs when there are 
public  goods ,  
The provision o f  securi ty i s  a classic  public  good : i f  one 
person safeguards a vil lage f rom attack by building a wa l l  around i t, 
for example, then the act ion of that person enhances the security of 
all  other vil lagers . O ther examples would be the provi s ion of c l ean 
water, road s,  or a market plac e .  Again, wi thin broad l imi ts,  if the 
benefits  of such services are provided to one person in a given 
locale, then they are general ly available to  everyone, 
The reason that marke t s  fail to l ead rat ional indiv idua l s  to 
supply a socially desi rab l e  l evel of public  goods i s  tha t public goods 
generate perverse incentives,  Because any individual can  "f ree rid e "  
on t h e  effort s  o f  o ther s ,  n o  one h a s  a particularly compelling 
individual incentive uni la teral ly to supply the public  good. Each can 
credibly bel ieve that he does bet ter waiting for another to furnish 
the good and then consuming the benef its for free, Choos ing 
rationally, individua l s  will  therefore behave in a way that 
undersuppl ies the public  good. 
Non-competi tive markets cons t i tute a third c ircums tance under 
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which individual rational i ty leads to social ly undesirabl e  outcomes,  
When there are but a few large actors in a mark e t ,  then each actor 
knows that his or her choice "make s a difference" ; repr esent ing a 
large propor tion of the transactions in the market,  each actor' s 
choices will  affect market condi tions in general , Under thes e  
ci rcumstances, rational individua l s  will  behave s trategica l ly ;  they 
will  make choi ces out of a regard for the effect of these choices on 
other actors and for the response which the other actors, behav ing 
rationa l ly ,  are l ikely to make in return. The cal cula tion of best 
s trategies under such ci rcumstances i s  l ikely to  l ead to  decisions 
which, while individually rationa l ,  may be social ly harmful 
decisions, for example, to col lude, to form oligopolies,  or to engage 
in res traints of trade, 
The study of product ion externalities,  pub l ic goods, and 
imperfect competi tion -- al l hav e generated interest  in economics 
precisely b ecause they underscore those areas in which marke t s  fail to 
l ead individua l ly rational choice makers into the making of social ly 
rational deci s ions , From the point of view of economic theory , they 
are therefore compel ling ; they represent counter examples to one of 
the ba sic  presuppo sitions in the field.  They are also significant 
because they point out those areas where forms of social intervention 
may be r equi red to correct the deficient opera t ions of the market,  
They are  thus "ba sic fare" in the  economics of  pol icy analy s i s .  The 
study of these problems has inspi red some of the mo st important 
methodo logical advances in contemporary economic s ,  advances in game 
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theory being a case in point,  And y et the significance of these 
crea tive areas of cont emporary economics appears to hav e been lost on 
those development economists  who see in the inefficient use of 
resources a s  prima facia ev idence of irra t ional indiv idual decision 
making . Th is fal lacy of aggrega tion i s  s tart l ing and depres sing, 
given the state  of the economic a rt s .  
I t  should b e  noted that j u s t  as  development economists  fail 
fully to appreciate the importance of problems of aggrega tion, so too 
do anthropo log i s t s .  Frequently,  for example,  the properties of social 
allocations -- their equi ty , their f airness ,  or the recogni tion they 
extend to certain value s :  age, weal th,  scholarship, or courage -- are 
at tributed to  the values held by individual members of a society . The 
rea soning that undercut s the inf erence of individual irrat iona l i ty 
from social irrationality extends t o  this ca s e  as wel l :  choices made 
by individua l s  out of a regard for the values they hold do no t in 
general aggr egate into al loca tions by soci ety which support the 
a t tainment of these value s ,  This is the lesson of much contemporary 
research in economic s .  And the clear impl ica tion is tha t any 
l iterature in anthropology which explores the "value ba s i s  of 
societies" must be trea ted with the utmo st sus picion. 
Any literature, moreover, which explains institutions and 
social practices in t erms of their "rationa l ity " also r e s t s  on faulty 
underpinnings ,  Explaining s ocial practices by "rational iz ing " them -­
i . e . by dis covering the sense in which they would be chosen by 
rational individua l s  -- merely recapitula tes the basic f al lacy of 
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aggrega tion, An exampl e  is provided by Po sner, who in a recent 
article examines the way s in which kinship and l ineage sy stems serve 
as mechanisms for social insurance , 27 When Posner and others who have
pursued this l ine of analysis imply that kinship institutions exi s t  
because they ef ficiently ful fill  the needs f o r  security against random 
losses,  they then commi t fal lacy of aggrega tion. Preci sely because 
ev eryone would be be tter off in a society which prov ides s ecurity , it 
i s  in no one' s par ticular inter est to  organiz e i t; for the benef i t s  
would then be reaped by al l members of soci e ty a n d  each member would 
therefore do better letting someone el se meet the cos t s  of organiz ing 
and then enjoy ing the benefi ts for free. The equil ibrium resul t i s  
thus the non-exi s t ence o f  the insti tutions; and the source o f  this 
ineffici ent outcome i s  the public goods probl em -- the exi s t ence of 
perverse incent ives  which l ead rational individua l s  to  make social ly 
undesirable decisions. 2 8  Posner's argument i s  thus underc ut , S o  too 
are the argument s  of a host of other s :  the anthropo logical ecolog i s t s  
who explain the organiz a tion o f  hunting and ga thering societies in 
t erms of the "rationality "  of their members, those  who examine the 
rela tions between patrons and cl ients as  a form of insurance, or those 
who account for the forma t ion of state sy s t ems in t erms of the 
superior prosperity which central iz ed political insti tutions can 
provide, 
Ra tional individual choices do not in general lead to social ly 
rat iona l outcomes .  Outside of economics,  the importance of this 
foundational resul t have been explored mo st activ ely in po l i tical 
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science, Legislatures and elec tora l sy stems, l ike markets,  serve a s  
means for aggrega ting individua l preferences into social outcomes, and 
the impl ica t ions of these sy stems for the use of society 's scarce 
resources have been explored by a host of scholars in the 
discipline. 2 9  Some, l ike Popkin and my self,  have extended this
res earch by examining the importance of aggrega tion procedures in the 
study of agrarian societies . 3 0  But no one to my knowledge has fully
explored the implica tions of the aggrega tion prob l em for anthropology 
in genera l .  
This i s  regrettable, for i t  i s  anthropo logy , o f  all  the social 
sciences, which insi s t s  on the interdependence of human agent s .  And 
the ba sic factor which genera tes the problem of aggrega tion is the 
interdependence of rational act ors , be it in their utility functions, 
as in the ca se of public goods; their production functions , a s  in the 
ca s e  of externaliti es; or in their interact ions in the market place, 
�s in the ca s e  of imperf ec t ly competi tive marke t s .  The l e s son of 
contemporary economic s,  in short,  is tha t i t  i s  preci sely when people 
are interdependent that individual ly rational behavior is l ikely to 
produce socia l ly irra tional outcomes.  And anthropology , of a l l  the 
social sciences, is therefore mo st s trategica l ly poi sed to reap the 
intellectual rewa rds posed by the paradox of aggregation. 
In any case, the importance of the aggrega tion probl em wa s 
first  recogniz ed in economic s ,  It h a s  provided t h e  ba s i s  f o r  much of 
the recent creative work in tha t field,  Dev elopment economists  of ten 
reason, howev er, in way s that suggest a failure to  under s tand i t s  
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s ignificance. This is dis turbing . 
Income as a Welfare Measure 
Another set of problems derives  f rom the implicit maximand of 
much of dev elopment economics ,  The mea sure o f  valua tion employed i s  
often a func tion of the gros s  na tional product : GNP itself,  t h e  per 
capita value of GNP, or change s  in the real value (or real per capita 
value ) of GNP, Policies which do b e t ter as mea sured by these cri t eria 
are commonly de signa ted "successful " development s trategies.  The 
measures are thus used to  choose among pub l ic policies,  But their use 
in that f a shion res t s  upon extraordinarily shaky founda tions . 
To employ any measure ba s ed upon the value of the gros s  
na tional product a s  a wel fare mea sure i s  to employ a cri terion which 
is ba sed upon the sum of the incomes of all  members of society . Such 
usage makes a vari ety of cri tical a s sumpt ions . One is tha t  a person's 
income is an adequa te measure of the individual's wel fare.  Naturally,  
this i s  not the ca se.  It i s  certainly not the ca s e  in societies where 
goods and s ervices are exchanged through channel s  o ther than marke t s ;  
the wel fare of people i n  subsistence economies o r  in economies where 
social reciprocity is of great signif icance would not be adequately 
measured by this criterion, Nor i s  i t  the ca se in developed 
societies,  where such factors as phy sical ext ernali ties -- air and 
wa ter pol lut ion, the spread of carcinogens, noi s e  po llution, etc.  -­
make a signi ficant impa ct upon peopl e's wel fare but cannot be bough t 
and sold in the market place and thus are not correc tabl e  through the 
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expenditure of income. Moreover, in ev ery society ,  there are cri tical 
non-economic value s .  Where thes e  are signif icant to people, choices 
which increa s e  people's incomes but reduce the extent to  which they 
share in these o ther values can make people wor se off,  But this fact 
would not be captured where a person's income i s  taken a s  the mea sure 
of their wel fare . 
Even allowing income to be a mea sure of individual welfare 
and I make that al lowance only for purpo ses of further argument -- a 
second problem ari ses : that of aggregation. GNP refers to the 
summa tion of all individual incomes, But incomes can b e  added into a 
compo site  welfare measure only if an additi onal uni t of income 
generates the same sa tisfact ion for each person ; fail ing that, one is ,  
in effec t ,  adding "appl es"  and "oranges".  Summat ion thus requires 
tha t ,  at  the margin, a uni t increment of income be valued the same by 
al l persons , Such an a ssumption must of cours e  be rej ected.  It i s  
parti cularly untenab l e  in si tua t ion where there a r e  d i s parities i n  
income, for i t  may wel l be t h e  c a s e  that addi tional income i s  valued 
more by poor persons than by rich one s ,  As a composite wel fare 
mea sure, then, GNP is particularly inappropriate in the context of 
developing societies,  Given the extent to  which this index is 
employ ed in development studies, it is even more startl ing to realize 
tha t the use of GNP as  a wel fare measure req uires tha t in adding the 
welfare of individual s  into a single composi t e  mea sure, the welfare of 
each individual may be weigh ted in proportion to their income, A t en 
percent gain in the welfare of a very rich person, after a l l ,  
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represents a larger change in the gross  na tiona l product than does a 
t en percent gain in the welfare of the poorest person; and development 
economis t s  often select a s  beat those pol icies which l ead to the 
greatest  gain in the gross na t ional product ,  
A t  minimum, this cri tique suggests  tha t development economics 
would do wel l to avoid the confusion of income wi th welfare, Indeed, 
mo st branches of economics do not sub scribe to that equa tion; people 
are as sumed to maximiz e utility rather than income. Fortuna tely , 
contemporary development economic s has tended to move away from i t s  
restrictively economic vi ewpoint and to  recogniz e the importance of 
oth er value s ,  Neverthel e s s ,  significant problems remain. 
S cholars do now acknow ledge that people have preferences not 
only with regard to thei r incomes but also over the dis tribution of 
income; they recogniz e as wel l that people have preferences over the 
certainty and reliability of their incomes as  wel l as with respect to 
their magni tude.  The growing emphasis on pol icies which would secure 
a more eq ui tabl e income dis tribut ion, ev en at  the cost of growth, and 
the wider acceptance of the need to  diver sify and to  reduce dependency 
upon particular markets -- bo th s ignify this sh ift in perspective, 3 1  
There i s  thus a movement f rom income t o  util i ty a s  the 
relevant maximand in development economics and this i s  certa inly 
wel come. Nevertheless,  the problem of aggregation remains.  It does 
little good to j oin the ranks of scholars such a s  Goul e t  who 
unblushingly expand the range of "core" values to include "l ife­
sustenance",  "sel f-esteem" and "freedom. 113 2  F o r  some people may 
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di sagr ee with the relativ e  weigh t s  he assigns to diff erent value s and 
with the trade-offs he is willing to make among them. Having 
de throned GNP as a measure of wha t  are the best po licies for society, 
then, what value sy stem are we to put in its place? And, in the face 
of difference s among indiv idua l s '  value s,  how are we to  know what is 
socially best? 
The Values of Government Equal the Values of Society 
Confronting such questions, dev elopment econom i s t s  make two 
heroic a ssumpt ions : that the concept of soci ety's ''wel fare" or "be s t  
interes t s "  exi s t s  and that the v alue s of society w i l l  b e  those values 
articula ted by its government .  An i l lustrat ion is offered by a 
development economist with whom, o therwise, I am in grea t  sympa thy , 
Michael Todaro . "Economics, 11 he wri tes "cannot be 'value f ree' , , 
Once • • •  subj ective value s  have been agreed upon by a na tion or,  
more specifica l ly ,  by tho se charged with the responsibi l i ty for 
national decision making , then specific • • •  public pol icies can be 
pursued,"33 The as sumption, in short,  is that something cal led the 
values of society can be distil l ed f rom the values of i t s  members and 
tha t the values of the government reflect this compo s i t e  cal led the 
social welfare. 
Common sense tel ls us such a s sumpt ions are not valid . For 
thos e  working in the developing a rea s,  the experiences of V i e tnam, 
Iran, or Chi l e  -- to name but a f ew  example s  -- suggest  the magni tude 
of the separation between popular aspirations and government pol icy , 
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And Wa terga te brings the lesson ev en clo ser to home. The eq ua tion of 
the government's values w ith tho se of society thus makes little  s ense; 
indeed, in the l ight of recent history , it v iolates good taste,  And 
insofar as development economists  generate planning models  to more 
efficiently impl ement the obj ectiv e  funct ions posited for them by 
third world governments,  there should remain grave doubt a s  to  whether 
these economists are in fact hel ping to maximiz e the social welfare. 
More relevant to the theme of this es say , however, is a s econd 
grounds for cri tiquing the tendency to equa te governmental pol ic i es 
wi th the social wel fare. There exi s t s  in economics a founda tional 
theorem, one which was ci ted by the selection commi ttee when they 
conferred the Nobel Priz e upon i t s  author, Kenneth Arrow. In l ight of 
the cri tique j u s t  mounted above, it acqui res part icular significance . 
For it s ta tes that one may be able to derive a social wel fare function 
for a soci ety; that i s ,  one may in fact be abl e  to distill  from the 
preference s of individual s  an ordering of alt ernative for soci e ty such 
that one alterna t iv e  can unambiguously be revealed as social ly b e s t .  
B u t ,  the theorem s tates,  if  this i s  true, then there is for sure a 
dictator a member of society who can secur e his  wi shes as  the 
social choice even when his preferences are unanimously oppo sed by a l l  
others members o f  society . 3 4  The convergence o f  t h e  les sons drawn by
common sense and the resul t s  of formal theory is s tartling . Inf erring 
what is socially b e s t  from the preferences of governments is only 
"safe" when the governments are dictatorsh ips.  
Anthropo log i s t s  are  no t ,  of  course,  immune to this cri tique . 
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They too advise governments; and they too take reas surance from the 
conviction that governmen t s  articulate the social welfare. 
Particularly when governments are demo cratic government s ,  
anthropolog i s t s  are tempt ed to bel ieve tha t the pol ici e s  they 
implement are in the best interes t s  of society . But the obverse of 
the Arrow theorem undercu t s  the founda tions of this bel ief . If the 
achievement of a social ordering is po ssible only given the exi s t ence 
of a dictatorship, then it is impos sible when no dictator exi s t s  
i . e . when there i s  a demo cracy . Under a democracy there i s ,  in 
general,  no way to determine what is "social ly b e s t " ,  It is possible 
only in non-democratic sy s t ems; but then of course, the determina tion 
then reflects  not the pr ef erences of society ' s  members but of a smal l  
subset  o f  them : a dictator, a n  o l igarchic el ite,  or the bureaucracy 
itself.  The dilemma is ba sic and profound . 
As with the development economists,  anthropolog i s t s  should 
have drawn the lesson of recent his tory : there is no nece s sary 
rela tion between the pref erences of governments and the wel fare of 
societies.  Unlike the anthropolog i s t s ,  however, development 
economists have little  reason to be forgiven for having ignored one of 
the moat important theore tical resul t s  in contemporary social sci ence 
-- the Arrow Theorem -- for it is a result which origina tes in their 
own discipline. The th eorem undercut s the rationale  for much of what 
development economics at tempt s  to do, but it is rarely c i ted in the 
development l i terature. That development economis t s  ignore it 
suggests  a mea sure of isola tion f rom what has been one of the creative 
and important currents in the field of economic s -- a l evel of 
isolation which should be deeply troubl ing to those who turn to 
economics for insight into the development proce s s ,  
Social Equilibria are Not Economic Equi l ibria 
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W e  have al ready noted that there i s  a pervasive tendency among 
development economis t s  to regard efficiency a s  a natural end sta t e  -­
as an al loca tion of resources which will characteriz e the interac t ion 
of rational human being s .  Clo sely linked w i th this t endency i s  a 
second : the tendency to presume tha t economic equil ibria will  
determine social outcomes,  The techniques employed in planning 
analysis or proj ect apprai sal,  for example, rely upon the bel ief tha t 
all  agents will  make those choices which maximiz e their economic 
obj ectives ; none wil l  then have any incent iv e to al ter their choi ces, 
for then they will  be worse off ;  and those al loca tions of resource s  
which sustain such universa l ly maximiz ing choices will,  a s  a 
consequence, be s table,  
Now, in g eneral ,  there i s  no reason to bel ieve that economic 
equi l ibria are eff i ci ent ; a s  we have seen, one of the maj or l e ssons of 
contemporary economics i s  that only in special ca ses  i s  tha t true, 
Ev en granting that they may be, there i s  certainly no general rea son 
to bel ieve that social or political eq uilibria will  correspond to 
economic equilibria . As a positive theory of how people are l ikely to 
behave, presuming that they will make choi ces in accord w i th the 
conditions which charact eriz e economic effici ency therefore has l i t tle 
to recommend i t  a s  a means of scientific analy si s .  Unfor tunately , 
such a presumption is pervasive in development economic s .  
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The problems with this approach are st rikingly i l lus trat ed in 
the analysis of pol icy formation. That this i s  so i s  troublesome, for 
i t  is precisely at  the l evel of pol icy analysis that development 
economics s triv es to make i t s  maj or contribution. 
Public  pol icy in developing areas l eads governments to 
intervene in market s .  Ye t gov ernments in developing countries do not 
intervene in way s that increase  efficiency ; indeed, they of ten prefer 
forms of public intervention that are inefficient,  for ineffici ency 
can be pol i tica l ly useful . Moreov er, the techniques they employ often 
involve di sequilibrium prices .  The behav ior o f  governments i n  pol icy 
formation thus violates two of the premises which charac t eriz e 
a t tempts to explain their behav ior in terms of economic analy sis , 3 5
To i l lustrate these argument s ,  consider the interventions of 
governments in developing a rea s in, say , the marke t s  for foreign 
exchange or for credi t. In these marke ts,  governments commonly set 
di sequil ibrium price s,  ones which create excess  demand ; they over 
value their currencies,  for example, or subsidiz e rates of interes t .  
Such policies are inefficient . Nonethel ess ,  from a pol i tical point of 
view, such pol icies are expedient : they are in equi l ibrium and they 
are perf ectly rational . 
The pol i tical,  as o pposed to the economic, rationa l i ty of 
these forms of intervention i s  sugge s ted by the na ture of the 
pol itical resource s  genera ted by the disequil ibrium pricing pol icies.  
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Governments lower prices below their eq uil ibrium l evel ; the result i s  
excess  demand . At such price s, marke ts d o  not c l e a r  and some o ther 
means of al loca ting the goods in quest ion -- be they foreign exchange, 
credi t,  or what not mus t be employ ed . Mo st commonly the form 
employ ed is rationing , In the face of artifici a l ly induced shortages,  
public authori ties confer access  to the scarce resource upon those 
whos e  pol i tical s upport they seek to a t tain or to rewa rd . They 
thereby build a coa l i tion of pol itical fol lowers -- a coa l i tion whose 
members owe their privileged s tanding to the pol icies of the regime in 
power . 
Typica l ly ,  many s uch mea sures have concentrated benef it s ;  they 
are reaped by the f ew  who gain s pecial acce s s  to the regula ted marke t .  
The cost s ,  however, tend to  b e  diffuse, In the case of foreign 
exchange,  for example, the costs are s pread acro s s  a l l  who seek to 
consume imports or local goods made with imported ma teria l s  but who 
now cannot do so b ecause the foreign exchange has been al loca ted to 
other use s ,  B eing tied to the government in power through their
dependence on divisible and excl udab le benef its,  tho se who po ssess  
rationed access  to the  sca rce resources have already been organized a s  
a group supportive o f  the regime i n  power. But those who bear the 
co s t s  of the pol icy remain a diffuse and disorganized col l ection of 
interes t s ,  aggri eved but pol itica l ly in disarray . The pol icy choices 
are therefore pol i t i cally s table.  
S uch forms of government intervention are common place.  They 
take place not only in the marke ts for credit and foreign exchange but 
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also  in  agricul tural markets,  markets for  land and housing, and 
markets for s ub sidiz ed input s and t echnologies . The pol icies are not 
economica l ly ef ficient ; and they do not employ an equil ibrium set of 
prices,  But s uch policies are po l i tica l ly expedient ; they are 
pol itically rationa l .  And, a t  least in the shor t and intermediate 
run, they have proven to be po litica l ly stable as  wel l .  De spite their 
obvious economic cost s ,  they continue to be chosen by gov ernment s and 
the pa ttern of rela tiv e  priv ilege which they sustain remains firmly in 
place in many developing nations , 
These pol icy choices thus represent a pol i tica l equi l ibrium, 
It is not the form of equil ibrium one would expect, were one to 
s ubscribe to  the analytic premises of development econom i c s ,  And any 
approach that is s urprised -- and disa ppointed -- by the f indings 
which it observes is simply not providing adequa te insight into the 
behavior it wa s designed to analyz e .  
QUO VADIMUS EX HOC? 
Dev elopment economic s, then, makes a vari ety of a s sumptions 
which weaken it at a v ery fundamental level . These as sumpt ions 
include : 
1 )  
2) 
Tha t ineffici ency implies irrational ity . 
That the no tion of the social wel fare is a meaningful 
concept ; that it can prov ide a guide to  pub l ic pol icy ; 
that i t  can be measured in economic terms ; and that i t  i s  
embodied i n  the choi ces o f  government s .  
3) Tha t rational people will make choices that l ead to 
ef ficient outcomes and that these outcomes will be 
stab l e .  
The primary argument o f  this paper i s  that these as sumptions 
are wrong and that development economics therefore has prov ided a 
disappointing source of social scientific theory by which to explain 
what we commonly ob s erve in the developing a rea s .  
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Viewed from a more dis tant perspective, i t  is po ssible to see 
the problems of development economics a s  stemming f rom a confusion of 
normat iv e  and posi tive analy s i s .  Given a s e t  o f  value s ,  economic 
analysis does indeed provide a fairly powerful s e t  of theories as to 
what choi ces have to be made so as best to a t tain them. Moreover, i t  
prov ides a cri terion that of efficiency -- for cri tiquing and 
evalua ting sugges t ed propo sals  for their attainment . Thi s  norma tive 
role for development economics remains inta c t ,  even granting the 
val idity of the criticisms put forward in this paper . 
Nevertheless,  a s  presently consti tuted, development economic s 
prov ide s l i ttle  insight into how people actua l ly behave or how 
collective al loca tions actua l ly get chosen . There are certain 
premises which should,  however, be salvaged for use in efforts to 
develop such theories.  In this section I isolate these premises and 
attempt to i l lustra te their usefulness .  
One pr emise i s  the presumption tha t people are  maximiz ing 
agent s .  Our cri tique suggests  not that we abandon this premise but 
rather tha t we expand our not ion of what is being maximiz ed to include 
more than the narrow set  of values represented by mone tary income. 
One of the mo st impor tant l e ssons of anthropo logy , certainly , is the 
rea l iz a tion of the diversity and richne ss of human value s .  This 
insight should not be lost . 
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I t  would also  be wrong to abandon the use of equi libr ium 
ana ly s i s .  To clarify , three important points must be made . One i s  
that eq ui l ibrium analysis does n o t  a s sume t h e  exi s t ence o f  a n  
equi l ibrium, much less  t h e  uniquene s s  of a n  equi l ibrium .  V ery 
commonly , indeed, efforts to analyz e the outcome of social proce sses  
-- i . e . to solve for their equil ibrium -- will yield a proof of  the 
non-existence of an equi l ibrium; a l t ernatively , even when exi s t ence is 
proven, it may be impossible  to prove uniquenes s .  In o ther word s ,  the 
use of equi l ibrium analysis does not imply a convic tion that the world 
i s  "in equi l ibrium"; nor does i t  imply an adherence to a bel i ef tha t 
the world i s  "static" or determina t e .  T o  equa te the us e of 
equil ibrium analysis with subscription to one or the other of these 
po sitions is simply to rai s e  a false i s sue , 
A second point is that I am not advoca ting the use of 
equil ibrium analysis a t  the macro-level . I am advocating i t s  us e in 
the analy s i s  of pa rti cular, micro-lev el problems.  By an equil ibrium I 
mean a situa tion in which no party has an incentive unil a teral ly to 
a l t er its behav ior . The pa tterns we observe in develo ping a reas and 
which we s eek to explain repr esent, after al l ,  regulari ties in choice 
making . And it i s  the lack of incentives to  depart from prevail ing 
pat terns of choice that defines an eq uilibrium. 
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La st ly , I am not advocating the use o f  equi l ibrium analysis in 
a purely economic fash ion. Ra ther, I feel that the no tion of wha t 
determines an equil ibrium should be expanded to include social and 
pol i tical institut ions and not merely marke t s .  Such insti tutions 
provide critical set tings within which maximiz ing choices get made , 
They of fer choo sers values in addi tion to economic value s :  
membership, office , pr estige, etc . They provide access t o  resource s  
o ther than income or productive t echnologies : to  power, fol lowers,
networks,  or sy s t ems of righ t s  and ob l iga tions . And they provide 
f rameworks wi thin which bargaining takes place and s trategies are 
developed ; they define, in short, the "rule s  of the game" which 
de termine the values of outcomes which can be sought by a l t erna tiv e  
courses o f  action. 
To i l lustrate these points ,  let  me take two exampl e s .  One 
a ri ses in the l i tera ture on West Af rica a t  the time of the impact of 
colonial ism. Contemporary scholars, while sometimes romat iciz ing the 
fact s ,  nonetheless have credibly argued that pre-colonial 
chieftaincies were "democratic , " in the sense that within rul ing 
l ineage s  there exi s ted a variety of "candida tes"  for chief ly office 
and that their capacity to gain popular support was often deci sive in 
gaining succe s sion to the throne . They have also  argued that it wa s 
the colonial powers -- particularly the British -- who inst i tuted 
rigid codes of genealogical succe s sion and that their reasons for 
doing so included not only their fai lure to under s tand the na ture of 
African societies but also their de sire for pr edictability in the 
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. . f h d' . 1 k' d 36  public af fairs o t e tra itiona ing oms .  I t  was l eft  t o  Ferguson
and Wilks to see the ironic property of the British "solut ion" : tha t 
i t  increa sed, rather than decreased, pr edictably in public affai r s .  
The detection o f  this irony repr esents an implicit u s e  o f  the 
maximiz ation postulate and equil ibrium analysis  in a non-economic 
s et t ing . 37
The underly ing model is that of  Anthony Down s . 3 8  Downs' model
rest s  on the premis e  tha t bo th ci tiz ens and s eekers after office are 
maximiz ers ;  both make choices so a s  to fulfill obj ectiv e s .  Peopl e  
have pref erences over pub l ic polici e s .  They seek to secure policy 
s tands by pub l ic officials that are in accord w i th th eir preferences; 
to do thi s,  they suppor t  those candida tes whose policy s tands are 
closest to their own most preferred posi tion. Candida tes seek of fice; 
to a ttain office, they take s tands on i s sues so a s  to s ecure the 
support of a maj ority of the citizenry . Ci tiz ens and candida tes : 
these maximiz ing agents are the ba sic actors in Down s' model . 
Figure 1 il lustrates a three person ci tiz enry . Pol icy s tand s 
are represented a long the horiz ontal axi s; they can be thought of as  
falling , say , along a "radica l-conservative" d i rection. And peopl e's 
preferences are represented as smooth, singl e-peaked curves  which take 
on gr eater value as they reach higher levels  along the v ertical axi s .
To i l lustrate the concept of equilibrium, as sume tha t there are two 
candida tes,  one of the left ( candida te A) and one of the right 
( candidate B ) . Cl early the candida tes for office have s trong 
incentives to adopt policy posi tions that l i e  at the middle of the 
Utility 
Person tll Person //2 Person 1/3 
Policy Position 
B 
Figure 1 .  A Repres entation of Pr o fo ronces in a Single Division 
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horizontal axi s .  Say ,  for example,  that A were t o  remain a t  the l ef t  
and B were t o  take a middl e  po s i tion, as  i n  f igur e 1 .  Candida t e  A' s 
s tand l ies a t  person l ' s  most preferred posi tion;  A gets per son l ' s  
support.  B i s  a t  person 2 ' s  mo st preferred po si tion ; B gets  per son 
2' s supports.  But candida te B also gets person 3 ' s  support vote,  for 
person 3 prefers B ' s posi tion to A' s .  B is clo ser to person 3 ' s  
posi tion and B ' s  po l icy stand therefore lies a t  a higher l evel o f  B ' s 
utility curve than does the pol icy s tand of A. 
The l e sson i s  obv ious . Candida te A does not want to loose.  
Therefore A,  in response to B ' s choice of s trategy ,  does best  by 
moving to the center in an effort to a t tract the support of a second 
person. Insofar as peopl e  choose candida tes who se pol icy po si tion 
they prefer and candida tes seek to a ttain office by winning maj ority 
support,  there is thus a pr edictable,  eq ui l ibrium outcome : the 
candida tes w i l l  move to the center . The candida tes who gain the 
support of a maj ority will therefore be those who adopt as their 
policies the po sition of the "median voter11 . 3 9  
The historical lesson i s  clear. When the British const rained 
competi tion and created a genealogica l ly de termina te order of 
succession, the incentives creating predictable pol icy outcomes were 
destroy ed . Who succeeded to office was determined ; but the public 
pol icies endor sed by the holders of of fice were no t .  An el ement of 
randomness was therefore introduced into public a ffai rs and the 
obj ectives of the Britain "reforms " defeated by th e measures which 
they chose to s ecure them. 
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The as sumption of maximiza tion and the methods of equi l ibrium 
analysis can thus give insigh t into micro-level probl em s .  As a 
further i l lus tration, we can turn to another exampl e .  I choose one of 
the classics : Evans-Pri tchard' s analysis of the probl em of social 
order .  Using the work of Evans-Pritchard , suppl emented by th e work of 
Howel l ,  i t  i s  pos s ib l e  to reconceptua l iz e  this analysis in the form of 
eq ui l ibrium analy si s . 40 
Among the Nuer, ca t t l e  are the ba sic form of property . To 
secure wealth, the Nuer invest  resources in br eeding and rai sing 
cattle.  Another way of acquiring weal th would be thef t .  Every 
indica tion is that the Nuer are tempted to steal,  and Evans-Pritchard 
states "ca ttle  are their dearest  po s se ssion and [ the Nuer] gladly risk 
their l ives to pil lage those of their neighbors .  1141 The strength of
their desire i s  further sugge st ed by Evans-Pritchard when he recount s :  
"As my Nuer servant once said to me : you can trust a Nuer with any 
amount of money , pounds and pounds and pound s,  and go away for years 
and return and he will not have stolen i t ;  but a sing l e  cow -- that is 
a different matter . 1142
The puz z le,  from Evans-Pri tchard' s point of view ,  was that 
despite the potential for thef t and disorder, the Nuer in fact t ended 
to l iv e  in rela tive harmony . Insofar as the Nuer raided cattle,  they 
tended to raid the ca ttle  of o thers ;  raids w i thin the tribe were 
rela tively rare phenomena , 43 Somehow the Nuer appear to have avoided
the potent ial ly harmful effec t s  aris ing from the unbrid l ed pursui t of 
self-interest.  And they appear to have done so ev en whi l e  lacking 
tho se formal insti tutions so common in Wes tern societies which 
special iz e in preserving the peace and forestalling violence : the 
court s ,  the police, and so on. 
In discus s ing Evans-Pritchard' s analysis of the probl em of 
social order, we can credibly abstract his account in a number of 
forms . In this essay,  I will portray it in the form of two-person, 
non-cooperative variab le-sum game, tradit iona l ly known as the 
pri soners' dilemma . 44
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Al l that I have said thus far sugge s t  tha t such an abs traction 
does l i t t l e  violence to Evans-Pri t chard' s analy s i s .  All that is 
required is that we conceive of the si tua tion of two property-holding 
uni t s ,  each of which desires to  increa s e  the number of i t s  ca t t l e, and 
the incentiv es which face them. Cal l the uni t s  famil i es I and II ,  and 
a ssume that bo th hold t en ca t t l e .  Each family c a n  choose b e tween two 
a l t erna tive s :  using force or remaining pas sive and nonviolent . Each 
know s that the other family faces a similar choice . And each knows 
what the resul t s  of their choice will  b e .  
Both families know that should bo th adjure the u s e  o f  force, 
each will continue to enjoy the po ssession of ten ca t t l e .  But bo th 
also know that raiding is prof i table.  Should family I raid f amily 
!I' s h erd whi l s t  family II failed to  resi st ,  it could a ppropriate 
eight of family !I' s ca ttle,  we shal l  as sume ; similarly , should family 
II raid family I and family I no t forcibly resi st ,  family II could 
gain eight ca ttle  at  family I' s expense.  Both also know tha t in the 
face of a raid from each other, there are gains to those who res i s t ,  
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even though they may pay a price in phy sical suffering . For purposes 
of argument,  as sume that wounds ,  the br eakdown of herding during the 
cour se of ba t tle,  and property damage result in lo sses equivalent to 
the loss of six ca t t l e .  I n  any ca se,  t h i s  outcome i s  to be preferred 
to not using force to protect one' s herd s ,  for then eight ca ttle  are 
lost to the predatory party . 
The s i tua tion is summariz ed in Figure 2 below .  The choices 
for family I are l i s ted on the left : F de signa tes the choice of force 
and "F designa tes the renunciat ion of forc e ,  The choices for family II  
are similar and are l i s ted a t  the top of the tab l e .  The entries refer 
to the outcomes for the paired choi ces of families I and II, the value 
of the outcomes being expr essed in t erms of numbers of ca ttle,  and the 
value to family I being l i s ted f irst and the value to family I I  being 
lis ted second . 45
F 
I 
F 
F 
4 , 4  
2 , 18 
1 1  
F 
1 8 , 2  
10 , 10 
Figure . 2 
The nature of the dilemma is clear. It is rationa l  for each 
family to choo s e  to use force ; as can be seen from Figur e 2 ,  each does 
best employing force no ma t ter what the choice of the other . 
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Moreover, it is also  clear that the use of force by bo th famil i es 
represents an eq uil ibrium and tha t thi s equil ibrium is unique, When 
both use force, i t  is in nei ther' s interes t to renounce i t ;  were 
family I uni la teral ly to abj ure the use of force, then its holdings 
would drop from 4 ca ttle to  2 and the same is true for family I I .  No 
other pa ir of strategies is in equilibrium ;  in a l l  other ca ses,  one or 
the other family does better by unilatera l ly changing i t s  choice of 
s trategy , The equil ibrium is thus unique , What is pecul iar and 
compel l ing, however, is the na ture of thi s equilibrium :  under i t ,  
both fami lies a r e  worse off,  Had they renounced the use of  force, 
they could each have ten ca ttle  but they now get only four , 
Individual rationa l i ty thu s l eads to a socially irrat ional outcome, an 
out come under which all persons suffer ,  Put another way , all  would be 
bet ter off liying peacefully, but none can afford to l ive tha t way . 
The s tructure of the prisoner' s dilemma thus captures th e frag i l i ty of 
social order, 
In analyz ing the origins of order in decentraliz ed societies,  
Evans-Pri tchard pursued two l ines of inquiry . One was to  look at the 
role of mechanisms for confl ict resolution and dispute settlement ; 
these mechanisms, in effect ,  were employed by the Nuer to cur tail the 
na tural t endencies set in mo tion by the incentive s tructure 
charact eri stic of the prisoner' s dilemma , The second wa s to 
conj ecture concerning more basic and fundamental institutions -- one s 
that did not control socially dangerous behavior but rather operated 
a t  a deeper level and al tered, in effec t ,  the v ery s tructure of 
incentiv es which so threatened the coh esion of Nuer society . The 
"deeper" insti tutions arose  at the level of rel igion and the moral 
order .  Elsewhere I have analyz ed bo th kinds o f  social controls and 
shown how they a l t er the na ture of the payoff matrix which cap tures 
the incentiv e s  l eading to the pri soner' s dilemma , 46  
Thi s  example i l lustrates the use of the as sumpt ion of 
maximiz a tion and equil ibrium analysis in non-ma rket set t ing s ,  I t  also  
i l lustrates an earl ier point : that  rational choices by individual s  can 
aggregate into socially irrational outcomes outcomes which no one 
pref er s ,  I n  def iance o f  the hy pothesis o f  the "hidden hand ", 
equilibria, when they exi s t ,  can correspond to outcomes which are 
abhorrent to all members of society . 
A RES EARCH AGENDA 
There are a mul ti tude of other potential applica tions of this 
form of analy sis,  and these s tand as candida tes for a research agenda 
which could generate increa sed interaction between economics and 
anthropology . 
One which would be climact ica l ly controv ersial and therefore 
fun would be the development of rational choice models for "Polyani­
ty pe" economies.  As the Polyani school points out, there are many 
societies in which markets are not complete.  In  such societies,  
certain goods or services can not be traded or exchanged . 
Al t erna tively, factors may be exchanged but a t  prices that are set  
out side the market, i . e . ei ther by pol i tical fiat or by cus tom ;  a s  a 
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consequence, the prices are invariant . It may a l s o  be true, the 
Polyani school points out, that price s,  when they exi s t ,  are no t 
uniform ; they vary according to the social ca tegory of the parties to 
the exchange .  
These characteri s tic pa t t erns a r e  well known by 
anthropo logi s t s .  Less well known i s  that these pa t t erns correspond 
closely to those obs erved in regula ted industries in advanced 
industrial economies.  The study of industrial regulation is a well 
developed branch of applied micro-economic s . 47 In regulated
indus tries,  certain factors may not be exchanged -- e . g .  a tomic fuel s 
in the nuclear energy industry or air rout es in commercial av iation. 
Prices a re set and maintained at f ixed l evels  for long periods of t ime 
and are subj ect to change through po l i tica l ,  ra ther than marke t ,  
mechani sms . Frequently,  different prices  a r e  s e t  f o r  different 
categories of consumer s ;  home owners are charged different rates than 
indus tri e s  for the use of tel ephone or elec t rical services ,  for 
example. The models  that have been developed by economis t s  for the 
analysis of the behavior of regula ted industries should be explored by 
anthropo logists  seeking to analyz e the impl ica tions of the "Polyani 
type" restri ctions upon economies,  
Another area ripe for analysis  i s  the study of the formation 
of inst i tutions . In fulfilling human want s ,  people sometimes use 
markets.  They more commonly use organizations . When they employ the 
one instead of the other is a que s t ion sporadica l ly explored in 
economic s ;  and i t  i s  one that should inspire a frui tful int erchange 
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between economics and anthropology . An a rea in which thi s que s t ion i s  
examined by economists  i s  in t h e  s tudy of t h e  firm. F i rm s  repr esent 
means of combining productive factors through organiz a tions rather 
tha t marke ts,  and it is an interest ing problem in economic analysis a s  
to why they ari s e , 4 8  Ano ther area i s  in t h e  study o f  incentive
sy s t ems.  Problems of moni toring inputs ( such as labor effor t )  or 
output s ( such as q uality of s ervice ) ,  economists  hav e f ound, yield 
incentives to sub s t i tute bureaucratic controls  for decentraliz ed ,  
market-like mechani sms .  Popkin h a s  recent ly appl ied thi s l i terature 
to the analysis of the na ture of organiz a tion arising about the 
production and marketing of different kinds of crops in Southea s t  
Asia, and h i s  work deserve s  close at tent ion, 49 
Not only should the research agenda be marked by the 
appl ica tion of rational choice analysis to  the origins of 
insti tutions ; but a l so it could be marked by the sy s t ematic 
investiga tion of the ethical properties of insti tutions . A cri tica l  
subj ect i n  contemporary economic research - - and one studied a s  wel l 
by contemporary moral philosophers ,  such a s  Raw l s  -- is the normat ive 
content of social decision procedures. SO Arrow' s theorem, mentioned
abov e, represent s a seminal contribu tion to thi s research . Other 
invest iga tors have examined the po s sibil i ty of devi sing social sy s t ems 
for choosing optimal l evels of pub l ic good s , 5 1  S t i l l  others have
designed procedures for resolving conflicts  of interest in way s which 
the cont est ing parties would regard as fair, 52  Works in anthropo logy , 
such a s  tho s e  of Col son, suggest  that there i s  much to be gained f rom 
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regarding "tradi tional order s "  a s  insti tutional frameworks which have 
been intent iona l ly innovated and chosen , 53 And there ha s long been a 
tradition in anthropology of interpreting "tradi tional societies" a s  
insti tutionaliz ed forms of a moral order. Another area, then, wherein 
anthropology and economics could interact to their mutual benef i t  
would be in the investiga tion of the way s in which inst i tutions can be 
structur ed so a s  to  preserve ethical proper ties i n  the choices made by 
human societies.  
CONCLUS ION 
The major message of this paper is tha t development economics 
is serious ly ,  indeed fundamentally ,  flawed , Wh i l e  it provides a 
normative framework for evalua ting the performance of develo ping 
a rea s,  i t  provides l i ttle ba sis  for study ing the way in which people 
behav e or choices get made in developing a rea s ,  This criticism does 
not origina te from an external vantage point,  moreover ; rather, it 
origina tes from within the economic paradigm . Development economics 
has fai l ed to pay a ttention to much that has been proven and l earned 
in cont emporary economic s ,  
I have also argued, howev er, that portions of the appa ratus of 
this field can and should be pr eserved , In particular, with sui table 
modif ica tions, the as sumption of maximizing behavior and the use of 
equil ibrium analy sis  should b e  retained as e ssent ial tools for 
po s i tiv e  analy s i s .  These too l s  have been applied to  the study of 
pol itics,  regula tion, and admini s tration, They should be appl ied by 
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anthropo logi s t s  to the analy sis  of choice and al loca tion in o ther 
non-marke t set ting s ,  I n  particular, through the study o f  the natur e 
�nd performance of social in stitutions commonly invest iga ted in 
anthropo logy , they can be used to open up new l ines of posi tive and 
ethical analysis -- l ines of inquiry which have briefly been ske tched 
in the concluding portions of thi s  paper , 
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